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In a series of contentious, confusing, and contradictory opinions beginning with Shaw v.
Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court has outlawed some, but not all congressional and state
legislative districts that were designed to insure that African-American and Latino voters had
real opportunities to elect candidates of their choice.  Citing only Supreme Court opinions and a
small part of the huge secondary literature on voting rights and redistricting,  Keith Bybee claims
that in voting rights cases, “conservatives” and “progressives” have fundamentally struggled
over the definition of “who ‘the people’ are” (7), and that he has discovered a way to circumvent
this non-terminating disagreement.  His analysis and prescriptions are unconvincing because he
too readily dismisses or ignores empirical scholarship, because he disregards all or parts of
Supreme and lower court opinions that do not fit his scheme, and because he provides no
justification in logic or constitutional law for his key proposal.
Since 1993, Bybee maintains, the five-person majority of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and  Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence
Thomas, has consistently adopted an individualist notion of political identity, while the four-
person dissenting minority of Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David Souter, and John
Paul Stevens (and Harry Blackmun and Bryon White before their retirements) has consistently
considered political identity to be group-based.   Instead, Bybee urges the Court to base its
jurisprudence on the idea of “political deliberation,” a basis that he believes will tend to reunite
the fractured public and strengthen the role of the Court itself.  In less exalted terms, he opposes
the actual or effective repeal of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which under Thornburg v.
2Gingles (1986) protects large, geographically compact minorities against repeated defeats by
white majorities in racially polarized elections.  This would guarantee diversity in legislative
membership, he contends.   To encourage deliberation, he would have the Court force
redistricting to be bipartisan.
A political theorist, Bybee scorns those who believe debates might turn on “simple
matters of fact,” who support their arguments with “an immense amount of historical detail,” or
who reduce complexities to “a few bits of numerical data.” (63, 43, 55)  Empiricists like Justice
Byron White or political scientist Bernard Grofman, who employ qualitative or quantitative
evidence to determine the intent or effect of electoral laws on minority representation, Bybee
announces, are guilty of “evasion of theoretical issues” or “evasion of conceptual issues.” (60,
115)  In contrast, Bybee neither analyzes data himself nor evaluates the conflicting empirical
literature on disputed topics.  Rather, he merely adopts convenient assumptions about reality: 
Political identity, he asserts, “develops during the process of debate and discussion, making it
possible for decisions to be made in the common interest.” (171) Bipartisan redistricting
“loosens incumbents’ grip on their constituencies and keeps the legislature responsive to the
electorate as a whole.  Through conflict and counterargument, policy is made in the common
interests of all.”  (169)  
Bybee’s selective treatments of legal cases undermine his statements about the nature
and consequences of Supreme Court opinions.  His contention that Mobile v. Bolden (1980),
showed that “the search for discriminatory intent in the design of political institutions was likely
to be fruitless,” (23) for example, is weakened by the fact that the plaintiffs successfully proved
such an intent when the case was remanded to the district court.  His description of the Supreme
3Court as a representative of “the people as a whole” (37) ignores the body’s self-conscious role
after the famous Footnote 4 of U.S. v. Carolene Products (1938) as the special guardian of the
rights of “discrete and insular minorities,” as well as its more common historical role as the
guardian of majority persecution of those minorities in such cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1857) and Korematsu v. U.S. (1944).   His declaration that group and individual conceptions of
rights form the central issue and dividing line in voting rights cases is undercut by the existence
of other dividing lines (intent vs. effect, symbolic vs. real harm, descriptive representation vs.
influence, judicial activism vs. deference to Congress, the Justice Department, or state
legislatures), none of which he discusses systematically, as well as by the inconsistency with
which both sides have held to the group and individual conceptions.  In Shaw v. Reno, for
example, Justice O’Connor, an individualist in Bybee’s scheme, posits three symbolic or
“expressive” harms to “our society” that ungainly minority opportunity districts may produce:
stereotyping, exacerbating racially polarized voting, and cuing representatives to be attentive to
only one group in a district.  Because, as she notes, redistricting “does not classify persons at all;
it classifies tracts of land, or addresses,” none of these three alleged harms, which are crucial to
her opinion, is really based on an individualized notion of political identity.  In Davis v.
Bandemer (1986), the case in which the Court ruled partisan gerrymandering justiciable and
which Bybee, surprisingly, does not discuss, O’Connor would have denied the Democrats
standing to sue because,  unlike “racial minority groups,” they “cannot claim that they are a
discrete and insular group vulnerable to exclusion from the political process by some dominant
group.”  And since at least the 1840s, during the first Boston school integration struggle, racial
progressives have condemned irrational distinctions that harm individuals and the use of what
4Justice Thurgood Marshall later called “crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes.” (Batson v.
Kentucky (1986))
Bybee derives his “political deliberation” theme from his speculative extension of Chief
Justice Earl Warren’s discussion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966) of the care with which
Congress considered the initial Voting Rights Act.  Warren, Bybee says, “seemed to suggest”
that jurisdictions which were required to submit changes in their electoral laws to Congress
before putting them into effect should conduct “Congress-like deliberations,” should “deliberate
on behalf of the entire people.” (85, 155)  But Warren did not say this, the Department of Justice
has never mandated it, and the bargaining over election laws and redistricting seldom resembles
the “nondiscriminatory deliberation . . . broad legislative learning” that Bybee imagines. (87) 
Even granting the possibility of “deliberation about the interests that all hold in common as well
as the policies best suited to serve those interests” (154), the logical connections between this
utopia and race-conscious and bipartisan redistricting are unclear.   Mandatory bipartisan
gerrymanders might reduce minority influence and representation, and cross-party redistricting
deals or minority representation might inhibit, rather than foster, a polite search for legislative
consensus.   These are empirical questions that Bybee does not pursue.  And curiously in a book
on constitutional law, Bybee makes no effort to tie bipartisanship or deliberation to any
constitutional phrase, doctrine, or theory.  Is the Constitution a mandate for the majority of the
Supreme Court to institute any political notion it fancies?
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